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Abstract
New Foundations of Cost–Benefit Analysis, by Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, represents the most
ambitious and credible effort to date to build a solid theoretical defense of the use of cost–benefit
analysis (CBA) in evaluating government regulation. In this review, three cost–benefit “skeptics”
offer their reactions to this ambitious and important book. We note its virtues – its humility, its
scrupulousness, its open-mindedness. We also explore its vices. If preferences are to be “laundered,”
is it intellectually defensible to remove the bad but not consider adding the good? Does Adler’s and
Posner’s welfarism really play the limited role they suppose, or does it risk “crowding out” other
important deontological and distributional values? If CBA is merely a decision procedure that
provides an imperfect proxy of welfare – the moral criterion we really care about – how do we know
that the proxy it provides in practice will actually be accurate enough to be useful? Isn’t this at
bottom an empirical question that cannot be answered by this thoroughly theoretical book? If CBA
is no more than an imperfect proxy for welfare, then alternative imperfect decision procedures may
perform better in the real world.
Keywords: cost–benefit analysis, economics, environment, regulation.
Introduction
The political landscape is shifting. The financial crisis has brought the dangers of unfet-
tered free markets into stark relief and prompted leaders from both parties to advocate
massive government intervention. And even before stocks began to plunge, a national
consensus had begun to emerge on the need for government regulation to stem another
global crisis – the steady, ominous rise in global temperatures. These dramatic events may
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be ushering in a new era in which regulation re-emerges as an accepted function of
government.
But what does good regulation look like? And how can we tell it when we see it? Some
argue that cost–benefit analysis (CBA) is the best way to separate the good regulation
from the bad – the socially useful regulation from the wasteful and corrupt. Granted, CBA
has a checkered past. In the US, it was first introduced into widespread use in federal
agency decision-making by Ronald Reagan at the behest of persistent industry lobbyists,
who clearly viewed it as a tool for squelching and delaying regulation. But it survived the
demise of that anti-regulatory era: President Clinton continued the practice. There are
now even scholars on the political Left, including a former environmental activist, calling
for its continued use (Revesz & Livermore 2008).
In the academic literature, a fierce debate over the theoretical foundations of CBA has
raged for decades (Tribe 1972; Mishan 1976). Critics early on identified significant flaws
in the theoretical justification for CBA that its proponents never successfully refuted (Leff
1974; Baker 1975; Kennedy 1981). But several years ago, a few legal scholars began to
suggest a different approach to the defense of CBA. Cass Sunstein suggested the idea of a
“pragmatic” defense of CBA in broad strokes (Sunstein 2002b), but it was Matthew Adler
and Eric Posner who painstakingly and thoroughly began to work out the details of that
defense in a series of law review articles (Adler 1998, 2000, 2003; Adler & Posner 1999,
2000; Posner 2001). And now, that effort has culminated in a book by Adler and Posner,
New Foundations of Cost–Benefit Analysis (Adler & Posner 2006). This book does indeed
suggest innovative foundations for the theoretical defense of CBA, injecting new life into
a decades-old debate.
The traditional defense of CBA under economic theory casts it as a direct measure of
efficiency. Under this view, a regulation that meets a CBA test is efficient in the economic
sense; that is, it maximizes overall welfare (Mishan 1976). This defense offers all of the
appeal of economic theory more generally. Perhaps most importantly, it seems to offer a
neat mathematical equation for solving messy social problems. At the same time, it is
vulnerable to most of the major criticisms that plague economic theory, like the inad-
equacy of willingness to pay as a measure of value.
Adler’s and Posner’s central innovation is to decouple CBA from overall welfare.
Rather than arguing that CBA directly measures overall welfare, they concede from the
outset that even in theory, the fit between CBA and overall welfare is no more than a
rough approximation. Nonetheless, they argue, this “rough and ready proxy” is good
enough for government work (p. 25). This allows them to concede, rather than fight,
some of the central critiques of welfare economics, like the problem of wealth effects.
Rather than having to deny the existence of these problems, Adler and Posner can sidestep
them by acknowledging their existence but simply trying to convince the reader that they
do not create big enough distortions to pose a problem.
Their basic argument comes in two parts. The first step is to convince the reader that
we should care about overall welfare. Here again, they wisely avoid making the kind of
ambitious claim that can be appealing yet vulnerable to criticism. Rather than taking the
utilitarian hard line and arguing, as so many law and economics scholars have (Kaplow &
Shavell 2002), that overall welfare is the only relevant moral criterion for most policy-
making outside of the tax and transfer context, Adler and Posner make the more modest
claim that overall welfare is simply one morally relevant criterion – perhaps among
several. This avoids many of the classic conundrums that utilitarians find themselves in,
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like the apparently welfare maximizing effect of “execut[ing] an innocent to appease a
murderous mob” or “enact[ing] measures that benefit[] the superrich at the expense of
the desperately poor” (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 53).
In the second part of their argument, Adler and Posner posit that, even though CBA is
not a direct measure of overall welfare, it provides a close enough proxy to be useful. They
draw an important distinction here between a moral criterion and a decision procedure:
A moral criterion identifies the features of outcomes that make them morally better
or worse than alternatives. A decision procedure is a technique for making choices,
and the morally justified decision procedure is that procedure the employment of
which leads to the best outcomes. (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 62)
Under this typology, Adler and Posner view overall welfare as a moral criterion and
CBA as merely a decision procedure. But because it is a decision procedure that tracks the
moral criterion of overall welfare reasonably well, it is, according to Adler and Posner, a
good (and “morally justified”) decision procedure.
New Foundations represents the most ambitious and credible effort to date to build a
solid theoretical defense of the use of CBA in evaluating government regulation. As we
prepare to enter a new era of increased confidence in the legitimate role of regulation in
society, it is a good time to examine these “new foundations.” In the following pages, we
offer our thoughts and impressions on this important book. Each of us approaches CBA
with a heavy dose of skepticism, but each of us also approaches Adler’s and Posner’s book
with a great deal of respect for the intellectual depth and rigor it has brought to the
debate, and with a huge debt of gratitude for all that its authors have taught us.
We begin, in Part I, with a catalogue of New Foundations’ virtues – its humility, its
scrupulousness, its open-mindedness. We then go on to explore some of the philosophi-
cal thickets that threaten to engulf Adler’s and Posner’s theory. In Part II, we take on
Adler’s and Posner’s claim that CBA, while not a direct measure of welfare, provides a
proxy for that moral criterion that is close enough to use. We contend that this is
ultimately an empirical claim that Adler’s and Posner’s thoroughly theoretical book does
not support. Finally, in Part III, we take up the crucial topic of alternatives to CBA,
arguing that the feasibility principle is more likely to track overall welfare than CBA
because it focuses on factors that are important and avoids getting mired in fruitless
attempts to quantify unquantifiable values. We also discuss the disconnect between the
institutional role Adler and Posner envision for CBA – as a valuable tool for reining in
and rationalizing over-zealous agencies – and the empirical evidence, which shows CBA
consistently being used as a “one-way ratchet” – a tool to weaken regulation.1
I. Crowded in the wings: The opportunity costs of CBA
New Foundations contributes to a discussion on the merits of regulatory CBA that has
been occurring at the intersection of economics, policy analysis, moral and political
philosophy, and law. Any attempt to simultaneously draw from and inform multiple
literatures in this manner runs the risk of oversimplifying and distorting, yet in New
Foundations Adler and Posner have managed to operate at an extremely high level of
sophistication in all of the frameworks that they deploy. This nuanced approach to the
CBA debate has many virtues, which will be briefly explicated. It also has some vices,
which will be enumerated with somewhat greater attention.
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A. Old foundations
To understand why Adler’s and Posner’s defense is in fact a novel one, it is important to
recognize that many presentations of CBA are not as admirably restrained. Broadly
speaking, regulatory CBA aims to provide a neutral and comprehensive method of
evaluating policy proposals, a way of aligning the diverse consequences and values impli-
cated by collective choices along a single quantitative metric. The framework therefore
asks regulators to predict, weight, and aggregate policy impacts in order to identify
options that maximize collective welfare, where “welfare” typically is defined and valued
according to the weight that affected individuals themselves would be willing to place on
an anticipated consequence (Arrow et al. 1996). Once relevant policy impacts have been
estimated and monetized in this manner, regulators can, at least in theory, use CBA to
select the point of marginal equivalence between social costs and benefits. Many econo-
mists and other commentators also believe that the application of CBA to a range of
existing and proposed risk regulation programs can provide society with a basis for
making optimal use of the entire regulatory budget that it devotes to risk prevention
(Breyer 1993).
Obviously, the normative desirability of social welfare maximization depends on the
attractiveness of the welfare criterion that is being maximized. On the standard CBA
account, welfare is intended to be a capacious concept; it can include anything that is of
significance to human wellbeing. However, welfare on the standard account must always
be located within an individual citizen’s welfare function (as opposed to some entity, such
as a community or a nation, that expresses its aims and values through collective insti-
tutions and processes), and must always be converted in some fashion to a common and
continuous quantitative metric (as opposed to some lexically ordered metric, such as
those found within constitutions and other deontologically inflected laws, that treats
certain rights or resources as inviolable). Thus, dominant presentations of CBA are
premised on the implicit assumptions that welfarism provides the correct moral philoso-
phy to guide public policy, that welfare is an individualistic and monistic concept, and
that willingness-to-pay valuations correctly transform welfare impacts into monetary
units for policy analysis.
B. New foundations
Recognizing how philosophically contingent and incomplete the standard welfare eco-
nomic framework is, Adler and Posner wisely steer clear of it. They claim only that welfare
“is part of the moral fabric of the universe, but. . . . do not insist that this fabric is
exclusively welfare-woven” (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 54). Likewise, they nowhere contend
that individual willingness-to-pay valuations provide an ideal approximation of welfare,
but instead acknowledge that numerous possible approaches exist and contend for
normative superiority.
This approach has many virtues. For instance, Adler’s and Posner’s welfarism is not
imperialistic. They are willing to admit the possibility that deontological trumps, notions
of desert and responsibility, and other non-welfarist considerations can also figure into
policymaking. Nor is their welfarism dogmatic. They recognize that plausible arguments
exist to support a variety of different currencies of wellbeing, including expressed or
revealed preferences à la most welfare economists, an objective list approach à la Amartya
Sen and Martha Nussbaum, a hedonic approach à la Jeremy Bentham, and so on. They
ultimately settle on a laundered preferentialist approach (about which more below), but
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they are careful to acknowledge that theirs is only one approach to the definition and
estimation of wellbeing.
Adler’s and Posner’s welfarism also is not sloppy. Occasionally, one encounters wel-
farists who refuse ever to specify what valuation metric they are using. In the extreme this
refusal can mean that their work consists only of elaborate tautologies (Kaplow & Shavell
2002; Coleman 2003). One also sometimes encounters welfarists who appear to pick and
choose among valuation metrics in order to respond to various objections and criticisms,
often without adequate disclosure that this opportunistic selection is going on. New
Foundations does not exhibit these ills. It is specific and scrupulous throughout. When the
authors do remain agnostic on particular issues, they do so only because they believe that
the issue is orthogonal to their present inquiry, not because they are trying to duck or
deceive.
Finally, Adler’s and Posner’s welfarism is not insensate. They are not utilitarians who
simply wish to maximize overall wellbeing irrespective of where it happens to roost (Sen
1970a, p. 22) or, worse yet, willingness-to-pay fetishists who would maximize monetized
wealth even to the point of extinguishing the very human lives that will supposedly be
“better off” on account of the accumulated wealth (Kysar 2007). Instead, Adler and Posner
(2006) take the moral challenge of establishing a value criterion quite seriously, and they
wisely shun pure willingness-to-pay or pure utilitarian approaches, which they describe as
“problematic intellectual ballast . . . to which CBA has long been tied” (pp. 7–8).
C. New challenges
As noted above,Adler and Posner (2006) advocate what they term“a restricted, preference-
based account of welfare” in order to implement the goal of maximizing overall wellbeing.
On this approach, regulators should value policy consequences according to individual
preferences, so long as (i) an individual actually has the preference, (ii) the preference
survives idealization, and (iii) the preference is self-interested (pp. 35–37). Thus, in sharp
contrast to conventional CBA approaches, which Adler and Posner (2006) rightly note are
grounded in “an implicit commitment to the view that people’s unrestricted preferences
should be respected” (p. 19), the authors advocate laundering unrestricted preferences
such that the basis for policymaking ends up reflecting only preferences that impact
personal wellbeing (rather than altruistic or other-regarding preferences such as environ-
mental existence values), and only idealizable preferences (rather than drug addiction,
racial prejudice, or other objectively bad preferences). In this manner, preferences count
for policymaking only if they are “sufficiently well-informed, authentic, deliberative, and
otherwise ideal to constitute a welfare improvement” (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 19).
Notwithstanding its admirable intellectual spirit, this approach raises an obvious
question: Why do Adler and Posner advocate trimming out only preferences that fail
idealization, rather than also adding in ideal preferences that the well-informed citizen
should have, but for whatever reason she lacks in the real world? That is, having taken the
critical first step away from welfare economics’ deep commitment to preferentialism, why
not go further in the direction of an objective list of resources, goods, or virtues as the best
proxy for overall wellbeing, since the authors have conceded that the individual is not
always the best judge of her own wellbeing? (Adler 2004). Adler and Posner might
respond that individuals would not experience a welfare gain from objectively good
outcomes that they do not, in fact, prefer. But that objection assumes the very primacy of
preferentialism that has been put into question. In fact, preferences cannot be objectively
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identified by policy analysts any more than a list of perfectionist virtues could be (Sagoff
2004; Kelman 2005). Accordingly, Adler’s and Posner’s decision to remain rooted in a
preferentialist account of welfare has the feel of an uneasy compromise.
Partial idealization of preferences also invites analytical complications. For instance,
when the authors describe problematic categories of preferences – preferences that they
think need to be laundered out of the welfare calculus – they describe altruism and
sadism as separate categories. But if one were operating from a baseline of unrestricted
preferentialism in the fashion of most welfare economists, then one might simply lump
altruism and sadism together into a single category of other-regarding preferences:
Regardless of whether one prefers another to experience pleasure or pain, the theoretical
challenge for welfarism arises from the fact that the preferrer makes her preference
contingent on the welfare impacts of another (Sen 1970b).
Described this way, altruism and sadism appear to be preference categories that
should be treated (and screened out) together. By instead discussing them separately,
Adler and Posner seem to implicitly concede a more Aristotelian conception of value, in
which altruism is perhaps screened out because of problems of double-counting or some
other pragmatic concern, but sadism is screened out simply because it is not virtuous,
because it is morally objectionable.2 Again, the question is raised, why not more affirma-
tively and comprehensively embrace an objectivist approach to the definition and
accounting of welfare?
D. Old challenges
In addition to its philosophical defense of CBA as a decision procedure with indirect
moral significance, New Foundations also seeks to account for CBA as a tool of intergov-
ernmental control (Posner 2001). From the first perspective, the important question is
whether CBA adequately tracks overall wellbeing (a question addressed below in Part II).
From the second perspective, the question is whether CBA is defensible in light of its
overall role and impact within a political system. The fact that both of these perspectives
are deployed in New Foundations means that Adler and Posner must take on challenges
that no single book, no single author, and not even a dynamic duo of authors, could
adequately address.
Unfortunately, the political economy track of New Foundations does not bear the
same level of intellectual care and catholicity as the moral philosophy track. Indeed, in
sharp contrast to their steadfast efforts to remain non-dogmatic with respect to moral
philosophy, the authors reveal a rather partisan worldview from the perspective of politi-
cal economy. For instance, when discussing how the preference laundering exercise
should be undertaken, Adler and Posner state that “for institutional reasons,” it should
probably be conducted or supervised in the US by “the personnel of the OMB [Office of
Management and Budget]” (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 150). This assignment is selected
with little consideration of alternatives or of arguments for or against the role of OMB in
US policymaking. Instead, in its political economy sections, New Foundations simply
presents CBA as a method by which the executive keeps a tight rein on regulatory
agencies, making them accountable to the president who is, in turn, believed to be
accountable to the people. Agencies are the villains in this tale, filled with “badly moti-
vated administrators” and “well-motivated but fallible ones” (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 98)
who seem to oscillate between being self-aggrandizing regulatory zealots or hapless
victims of industry capture.
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This picture begs to be complicated. A fruitful approach would pursue an alternative
that Adler and Posner (2006) themselves raise in New Foundations, but quickly abandon.
At one point, they somewhat incredulously refer to the “interesting possibility” that “the
president and the OMB are captured by industry while the agencies themselves are not”
(p. 121). To many observers, this alternative is not just an interesting possibility, but an
obvious and disastrous reality. Indeed, everything that has been learned about the intimi-
dation and abuse of scientists and career civil servants at EPA and the Department of the
Interior during the last several years bears that impression out (Doremus 2005, 2008).
From this perspective, the authors’ uncritical assignment of preference-laundering
responsibility to the OMB appears insufficiently cynical. Whatever its status in moral
philosophy, regulatory CBA in lived political experience is inseparable from institutional
and political economic questions regarding the proper locus of regulatory control. The
OMB’s role from this perspective cannot simply be equated with presidential – and
therefore democratic – accountability.
Throughout a recent US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rulemaking, for
instance, one can read between the lines a sense of frustration among EPA staff members
regarding the executive’s demand that the agency generate quantitative and monetary
estimates of regulatory impacts at the same time that the OMB was refusing to grant the
agency required approvals to conduct original valuation studies (Kysar 2009b). Because
CBA requires the generation of enormous amounts of empirical and monetary data in
order to operate anything like a reliable proxy for overall wellbeing, the ability to assign
and manipulate the burden of proof in policymaking settings therefore becomes crucial.
OMB’s ability to demand the use of CBA while simultaneously denying authorization to
develop the empirical record to fulfill its reliable use meant that CBA became a device for
watering down Congress’s clearly stated requirements in the Clean Water Act.
Interagency dynamics such as these must be appreciated in order to properly evaluate
legal academic arguments, such as Adler’s and Posner’s, that attempt to defend regulatory
CBA as an instrument of accountability. Regulatory CBA does not serve democratic
accountability in the abstract; rather, it serves accountability to particular officials and
particular institutions that may or may not partake of democratic legitimacy themselves.
In the US, CBA in practice has tended to serve agency accountability to the president,
even as against the contrary wishes of Congress. Indeed, Congress has only rarely
endorsed CBA in the environmental, health, and safety laws that it has passed. Thus, the
institutional and political economic arguments offered by Adler and Posner in favor of
CBA must be understood in the context of the larger debate over executive power that has
been brought to the fore during the most recent Bush Administration. To simply equate
agency accountability to the president with democratic accountability is to adopt a
particular and controversial theory of the constitutional separation of powers (Calabresi
& Rhodes 1992; Lessig & Sunstein 1994; Froomkin 1994; Percival 2001; Bressman &
Vandenbergh 2006; Symposium 2008).
E. Challenges yet to come
For dimly understood reasons, optimific frameworks such as welfarism have a tendency
to crowd out competing frameworks, even when practiced by theorists with the rigor and
humility of Adler and Posner. To give just one example, when Adler and Posner discuss
the incommensurability objection to CBA – that is, the objection that reducing all values
to a single monistic language of utility or welfare works over time to actually reconstitute
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what we care about in a different and lesser form – they do so largely by asking whether
this process would cause “negative psychological impacts” or “make people upset” (Adler
& Posner 2006, p. 164). Such emotive consequences are, of course, distinctively welfarist
impacts of the decision to abandon incommensurability; accordingly, to focus on these
impacts as the relevant criteria for deciding whether incommensurability is a serious
concern is, in a sense, to deny the very existence of the concern.
Adler and Posner offer a variety of additional arguments against the incommensu-
rability concern, but they tend to be primarily interested in whether the idea of incom-
mensurability makes sense from within a welfarist framework. Naturally, the answer is
no: “We think it implausible that ecosystem destruction, the loss of an endangered
species, or other forms of environmental degradation would have a welfare impact on an
ordinary individual so substantial that no amount of money could repair the welfare loss
to her” (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 159).
Adler and Posner want to carve out a separate place for welfarist determination of the
content of law and policy. They do not wish to deny the existence or seriousness of
non-consequentialist factors like incommensurability; they just want to cabin them so
that welfarist and non-welfarist frameworks can peacefully coexist.3 The problem with
this approach is that laws never merely reflect preferences, but also help to produce them.
Law plays a role in endogenously constituting the categories with which we view and
value the world. Thus, to embrace and express a position of commensurability within our
environmental, health, and safety laws may not simply be a concession to practicality or
to a limited role for welfarism. It may instead be the commencement of a process of
cultural change that eventually allows welfarism to become the hegemonic lens that Adler
and Posner expressly disavow.4
Indeed, the authors themselves appear to slip down that slope at various points in
New Foundations, such as when they defend the use of a monetized value of human life
for regulatory CBA on the theory that “[t]here are numerous contexts, other than CBA,
in which premature death or the risk of premature death is priced” (Adler & Posner 2006,
p. 178). The examples they provide, such as damages awards in tort suits, are all contexts
in which a wrongful death is being compensated for ex post; none of the examples
concerns an ex ante decision to allow a premature death to occur, as CBA does
(Heinzerling 2000, 2006).
This concern is related to a larger, and final, point about the potential role of CBA
within contemporary legal culture, even the more modest and non-dogmatic form of
CBA offered by Adler and Posner. As noted above, New Foundations is careful to accept
the importance and viability of non-welfarist inputs into policymaking. However, the
book’s attention is otherwise exclusively focused on developing the best version of wel-
farism that the authors can muster. Moreover, there are moments when the authors
suggest that the outputs of welfare calculation should dominate policymaking, even if
they do not go so far as to say that it should completely occupy it, as other welfarists have.
This impression of welfarism’s dominance is most dramatically revealed in New Foun-
dations by the authors’ statements that “overall welfare is the baseline goal of agencies”
(Adler & Posner 2006, p. 102) and that relevant deontological trumps are “more or less”
already captured in the constitution (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 157).
If the important deontological considerations are to be found in the constitution,
then we cannot really understand the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal
Protection Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Wilderness Act, and numerous
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other legislative steps to cordon off certain natural resources from the market’s – and by
extension welfarism’s – demand that their worth constantly be demonstrated in order to
avoid being transformed into just another factor of production. More dramatically, one
could argue that modern environmental law has been centrally concerned with examin-
ing and redefining the relationships that exist between the political community and
various “others” of environmental law, such as future generations, members of foreign
nations, and non-human life forms (Kysar 2009a). These populations are both vulnerable
to environmental harm and disabled from participating in the political communities that,
in large part, determine their fate. They are not included within the orbit of constitutional
rights that Adler and Posner suggest exhausts the relevancy of deontology to law. Yet they
also are not addressed by regulatory CBA, since their status must be determined by
judgments that are analytically and morally prior to CBA.
CBA produces especial controversy in the environmental context because the param-
eters typically excluded from analysis under CBA – those matters that are taken as given
or otherwise ignored in the analysis – are the same parameters that many observers
believe to constitute environmental law’s raison d’être. CBA can reveal what is welfare-
maximizing only because certain critical judgments regarding whose welfare, valued
according to what standards and procedures, have been taken off the table. Thus, when
Adler and Posner (2006) state that “a virtue of CBA is that it reduces moral considerations
to an algorithm that requires no, or little, moral judgment” (p. 135), they actually identify
as a virtue what critics regard as the methodology’s chief vice. To critics, the use of CBA
to implement environmental, health, and safety laws often appears to be an attempt to
truncate the scope of those laws, excluding from view certain questions and possibilities
that do not fit within the individualistic, preferentialist, and outcome-oriented algorithm
of CBA.
For example, CBA as conventionally practiced in the regulatory context: (1) cannot
determine safe minimum standards in relation to particular natural resources or ecosys-
tem services, since its welfarist framework adopts the Grundnormen that all values are
commensurable and that all resources substitutable (Bishop 1978; Howarth 1995;
Randall & Farmer 1995); (2) cannot fix a society’s obligations to foreign citizens or
non-human species, since those questions demand an analytically prior determination of
whether, and on what basis, such entities “count” within the cost–benefit community
(Trumbull 1990; Freeman 1993); and (3) cannot clarify a society’s obligations to future
generations, since its method of translating future costs and benefits into present values
implicitly prejudges the very questions of distributive equity and environmental sustain-
ability under consideration (Norgaard & Howarth 1991, p. 177; Cowen & Parfit 1992;
Page 1997; Kysar 2007).
Nor are these the only areas of environmental law in which regulatory CBA is
incomplete. The method also: (4) provides an inadequate framework for contemplating
catastrophic potentialities such as those associated with climate change, since the meth-
odology assumes a smooth linear world in which median expectation values provide
reliable decision criteria (Weitzman 2007); (5) provides little guidance on whether to
reallocate burdens of proof or design other policy methods for managing informational
uncertainty, since CBA depends on the assumption that adequate information for calcu-
lation either already exists or can be generated through methods that are separate from
the policy judgment itself (Loasby 1999); and, finally, (6) cannot accommodate law’s
affirmative role in redefining rights and in influencing preferences, since the methods of
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valuation typically deployed in welfare economics infer costs and benefits against the
existing backdrop of rights and preferences (Tribe 1974; Norton et al. 1998).
When CBA is used to implement laws aimed at these kinds of questions, the meth-
odology ends up treating that which should be outcome determining as instead outcome
determined. For instance, the Endangered Species Act as construed in TVA v. Hill (1978),
and the Clean Air Act as construed in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.,
(2001) would be incomprehensible from the perspective of CBA, since the statutes are
aimed at changing the legal foundation of existing ordering, rather than at conforming
law to the predilections of the status quo.
Again, Adler and Posner seem to protect themselves against these kinds of objections
by emphasizing that their welfarism can be supplemented by other considerations when
fashioning law and policy. But to draw a lesson from economics, there are significant
opportunity costs to the effort to fine-tune CBA and other applied welfarist techniques,
when the moral and political questions just mentioned remain a mere sideshow. For
instance, at one point in New Foundations, Adler and Posner (2006) advocate the hiring
of more economists by government to improve “agency culture” (p. 189), but the cultural
deficit to be remedied arguably requires individuals who are better schooled in the
plurality of values, rather than in the value monism of welfare economics. Elsewhere
Adler and Posner (2006) wish for “perfect welfarist measurement” in which every policy
impact would reflect the “disaggregated” value of individual lives (p. 181), but arguably
we should be thinking more about those life forms that do not even register as interest-
holders in our current welfarist framework. Finally, the authors suggest that individuals
should be made to participate in contingent valuation studies as a “civic duty” (Adler &
Posner 2006, p. 166), even if the valuation framework is offensive to them, when arguably
we should be asking for far greater sacrifices from each other than merely accepting the
treatment of environmental protection as a trip to the shopping mall.
In short, we hope that, having shown that CBA can play only an incomplete role in the
formation of law and policy, Adler and Posner now will devote their considerable talents
and ingenuity to the sideshows, the questions that loom offstage and that cannot be
resolved by or even posed within the language of welfarism, but that are growing in
urgency nonetheless.
II. Coming down to earth: The impracticality of CBA
Adler’s and Posner’s defense of CBA is grounded in more than just their thoughtful and
painstakingly developed defense of a limited account of welfarism. They also argue that
CBA is the best way to estimate and weigh the welfare effects of any potential policy
decision. They do not contend that CBA can provide a direct measure of overall welfare,
but rather that CBA provides a proxy that is close enough to be useful. In making this
claim, however, Adler and Posner (2006) fail to fully appreciate one of the central insights
of the book: just because a decision procedure tracks overall welfare in theory, we cannot
assume it will necessarily do so in practice (p. 69).
Once they have explained the distinction between a moral criterion (like welfarism)
and a decision procedure (like CBA), Adler and Posner pose a rhetorical question: Why
settle for a decision procedure like CBA that is no more than an imperfect proxy for the
thing we really care about? Why not simply craft a decision procedure that directly
implements overall welfare? They dub this hypothetical decision procedure “direct imple-
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mentation.” Then they answer their question by pointing to the mismatch between theory
and practice. While moral criteria operate in the world of theory, decision procedures
must be able to deal with the hurly burly of the real world. So, Adler and Posner tell us,
even though in theory direct implementation would track overall welfare perfectly, in
practice it would fail miserably. Direct implementation would be far too expensive and
time consuming to be feasible. Moreover, it is so complicated that it would be hopelessly
non-transparent to all but the technically trained. As such, it would be very difficult to
monitor and accordingly vulnerable to political manipulation and corruption. For all
these reasons and others, direct implementation as a decision procedure strays very far
from the criterion of overall welfare that it was designed to track in the first place.
Does this sound familiar? These are exactly the complaints about CBA as a decision
procedure that many of us have been voicing for years. The problem is that, while their
defense of overall welfare as a morally relevant criterion and their description of CBA as
an imperfect proxy for overall welfare are thoroughly, painstakingly, and convincingly
argued, Adler and Posner have failed to demonstrate that CBA as a decision procedure
does not suffer from all the same shortcomings they associate with direct implementa-
tion: inaccuracy, vulnerability to manipulation, and inordinate expense.
A. Inaccuracy
Although in theory CBA seems like it should roughly track overall welfare, will the results
it produces in practice track welfare accurately enough to provide meaningful informa-
tion? To their credit, Adler and Posner acknowledge many of the problems with CBA that
make it an imperfect proxy for overall welfare. But, because they defend it as a decision
procedure rather than a moral criterion, they have an easy out. In response to the
problems of wealth effects, the endowment effect, imperfect information, discount rates,
and other problems that have always plagued CBA, they can simply say: We never said it
was perfect; it’s just a rough and ready decision procedure!
But just how imperfect is it? If it is just a little bit imperfect, as Adler and Posner
suggest, then maybe it’s good enough for government work. But if the various imperfec-
tions result in large disparities between CBA and overall welfare, then it may actually
serve to mislead rather than enlighten decision-makers. As Adler and Posner (2006)
acknowledge on the final page of the book, this is “at bottom an empirical question”
(p. 190). Yet because New Foundations stays primarily at a theoretical level, it never
answers the crucial question of whether CBA’s various well-known infirmities – imper-
fect information, the endowment effect, discount rates, and wealth effects, to name a few
– will, in practice, cause disparities between CBA and overall welfare that are simply
negligible and best ignored, or large enough to distort outcomes.
Imperfect information
One of the biggest problems that hampers the accuracy of CBA is that we simply do not
have the data, nor indeed the basic understanding of many of the physiological and
environmental processes that affect human welfare, to quantify many aspects of welfare.
Adler and Posner (2006) are certainly aware of the problem. Indeed, they concede that
“CBA analysts, in practice, ignore welfare dimensions [that] are just too hard to estimate
given current techniques – for example, fear or friendship” (p. 78). They are right that
certain aspects of welfare are routinely left out of CBA because they cannot be measured
or quantified. But “fear and friendship” are the least of its problems.
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CBAs of environmental regulations inevitably leave out whole categories of benefits
because relevant data are simply unavailable. One study looked at 25 CBAs of agency
rules reviewed by OMB in a one-year period and found that in 19 of the 25 cases, the
agencies were unable to monetize any of the rules’ benefits. In the remaining cases,
significant benefits were omitted (Driesen 2006; Hahn & Dudley 2007). The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 2006 CBA of its new rule setting fuel efficiency
standards for light trucks omitted the climate change impacts of the rule entirely (US
Department of Transportation 2006). The EPA’s CBA of its rule regulating cooling water
intake structures at power plants left out 98.2% of the fish that would be saved.5 And the
EPA’s CBA of its Mobile Source Air Toxics Rule left out literally all of the benefits at which
the rule was aimed; that is, those associated with reductions in air toxics.6
Because the benefits of regulation are so often harder to quantify than the costs, these
omissions lead CBAs to be systematically biased against regulation. Moreover, because we
so often lack the data or scientific understandings necessary to make definitive non-
controversial estimates of benefits, CBA is plagued by indeterminacy of enormous pro-
portions. A study by Cass Sunstein of the EPA’s CBA for its regulation of arsenic in
drinking water, for example, found that while the EPA estimated the costs of that rule at
around $210 million, reasonable people making reasonable assumptions might peg the
benefits of the rule anywhere between a low of $13 million or a high of $789 million
(Sunstein 2002a; Sinden 2004). This extreme level of indeterminacy means that the
outcome of a CBA can always be contested and that agency personnel can always manipu-
late the numbers to reach a politically motivated result. The CBA that accompanied the
EPA’s proposed mercury rule for power plant emissions, for example, initially found
benefits of $15 billion to $73 billion and costs of just $2 billion to $5 billion (Heinzerling
& Steinzor 2004). When the proposed rule produced a public outcry for being too lenient,
the EPA responded not by changing the rule, but by adjusting the CBA. This time the CBA
found net costs of $850 million, rather than the tens of billions of net benefits it had found
in connection with the proposed rule.7
CBA may seem to track overall welfare reasonably well in theory. However, when the
inadequacy of information leads to indeterminacy of this magnitude, we have to ask
whether CBA produces useful or even meaningful results.
Wealth effects
Because CBA attempts to measure welfare in terms of dollars, it suffers from a long-
recognized infirmity, the problem of “wealth effects” (Adler & Posner 2006, pp. 72–73).
Stated simply, this problem arises from the fact that an additional dollar is generally
worth more to a poor person than to a rich person. A project that causes a large welfare
loss to a community of poor people may therefore be toted up by CBA as less of a dollar
loss than a similar project that causes a relatively small welfare loss to a community of rich
people (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 142).
Adler and Posner (2006) are well aware that this problem can cause the results of CBA
to diverge significantly from overall welfare maximization. Initially, they suggest that the
problem can be solved by adjusting the preferences of the rich and poor through the use
of distributive weights. Thus, an individual’s preferences would be multiplied by some
factor inverse to her wealth (p. 73) However, this raises a whole host of difficulties, and
while economists have tried hard to resolve them, there is still no agreed upon method for
imposing distributive weights (p. 152).8
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Ultimately, Adler and Posner (2006) conclude that “the more practicable course” is for
agencies to forego the minefield of distributive weighting and instead simply “avoid
projects where the distribution of wealth among project winners and losers is substan-
tially different” (p. 152). They present this as a moderate and unobjectionable proposal.
The implied assumption is that the status quo is neutral and that when government
refrains from acting, it can do no harm. In fact, however, this seemingly modest proposal
would have far-reaching implications. If government really adopted a policy of avoiding
projects (or regulations) where the distribution of wealth among project winners and
losers differed substantially, there would be no corrective action in all sorts of situations
in which the burdens of industrialization have fallen disproportionately on the poor. This
would mean, for example, taking no steps to reduce pernicious levels of lead and par-
ticulate matter, which tend to concentrate in inner city areas. If implemented on the
international level, presumably this approach would also require governments to turn a
blind eye to climate change, since such regulation will inevitably impose the largest costs
on the richest and most carbon-intensive countries in the world, while conferring a large
share of benefits on some of the poorest countries in the world.
The endowment effect
Another well-known problem with CBA is the endowment effect. The CBA analyst
measures the costs and benefits of a project by adding up the “compensating variations”
(“CVs”) associated with each individual affected by the project. An individual’s CV is the
amount of money one would need to either give to or take from her if the project were
implemented in order to make her equally as well off as she would have been in the status
quo. The problem is that, for reasons that are not entirely understood, experiments
repeatedly show that the amount of money people are willing to pay to get something
they do not have is consistently lower than the amount they are willing to accept to give
up something they have (Horowitz & McConnell 2002). This means that particular goods
do not have stable CVs. An individual’s CV for a particular good will vary depending on
whether it is something she previously had that is being taken away, or something she
does not have but stands to gain. This creates an inherent indeterminacy in CBA that has
been dubbed “the endowment effect.”
Adler and Posner (2006) are, of course, well aware of the endowment effect. They
acknowledge that it produces indeterminacy in CBA (p. 168), but they quickly brush off
the problem. “The fact that CBA might produce an indeterminate result is not a serious
problem for CBA,” they tell us, “as long as this occurs seldom” (Adler & Posner 2006,
p. 169). Once again, the fundamentally empirical nature of the inquiry rears its head. But
rather than simply acknowledging that the question is an empirical one that is beyond the
scope of their decidedly theoretical book, Adler and Posner answer the question they have
posed with a hypothetical. In what comes off as a bit of a non sequitur, they ask us to
imagine that 90% of CBAs are determinate and accurate. They then observe that, if this
were true, CBA would be a good procedure. After delivering that unhelpful tautology, they
take refuge again in theory. “Considerable theoretical work,” they tell us, “suggests that, if
preferences are well-behaved, the difference between an individual’s willingness to pay
(WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) amounts for a given project will usually be
small” (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 169).
Finally, when Adler and Posner (2006) do look at the empirical literature, they
concede that it “often show[s] a much larger WTP/WTA disparity” than the theoretical
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literature predicts (p. 169). In other disciplines, when the experimental data do not
support the hypothesis, the response is to throw out the hypothesis. Not so here. Adler
and Posner throw out the experimental data instead. The large WTP/WTA disparity is a
result of “strategic behavior” rather than legitimate preferences, Adler and Posner tell us.
The solution is for the CBA analyst to “launder” preferences of these “distortions” before
using them. They offer few guidelines for the analyst engaged in the delicate and perhaps
presumptuous task of deciding which preferences to retain as “true” and which to launder
out as “distorted.” But this is no doubt a dangerous business that strips the concept of
preferences of one of its most appealing characteristics – its democratic nature – and
makes CBA vulnerable to charges of elitism.
Ultimately, it is hard to be sanguine about the large WTP/WTA disparities that
consistently show up in the experimental data. Indeed, WTA amounts are often five to ten
times higher than WTP amounts (Knetsch 1990). This has the capacity to create signifi-
cant indeterminacy in CBA. Moreover, since WTP is more often than not the measure
used in quantifying environmental values, this is another source of indeterminancy
(Knetsch 1990).
Discounting
Discounting is another big source of indeterminacy for CBA. Everyone agrees that dollars
should be discounted, because interest rates and inflation clearly make a dollar tomorrow
less valuable than a dollar today. But when it comes to things that are less clearly
translatable into dollar terms – like human lives, or ecological values – it is much less clear
what discount rate should be attached to future gains and losses, or, indeed, whether any
discount rate should apply at all (Revesz 1999).
Here, Adler and Posner simply punt. They acknowledge that the choice of discount
rate has a dramatic effect on outcomes. In fact, they provide an elegant chart that shows
how over a 100-year period the difference between applying no discount rate (an
approach to environmental values advocated by a number of prominent scholars
[Heinzerling 1999; Revesz 1999]) versus a 7% discount rate (the approach advocated by
the OMB [Office of Management and Budget 2003]) yields a disparity of $5 million
versus $5,000. So, unless we can agree on an appropriate discount rate, this source of
indeterminacy clearly matters a lot. Yet, even though Adler and Posner (2006) acknowl-
edge that the choice of discount rate remains “hotly contested” (p. 173), “with no defini-
tive resolution in sight,” they insist that this “in no way undercuts [their] basic
argument . . . for CBA as a welfarist decision procedure” (p. 174).
Do they perhaps protest too much? Adler and Posner offer no solution – no single
defensible approach to discount rates. But without a resolution, the problem of discount
rates continues to cause significant indeterminacy and endless contestability in CBA,
thereby seriously undercutting their argument.
But that’s only part of the story. The big problem with discounting is that, over long
time spans, any discount rate devalues the lives of future generations vis-à-vis present
generations. Adler and Posner try to sidestep this problem by telling us again that CBA is
not perfect. It is not a super-procedure. It does not take into account all factors that may
be relevant to a decision. Distributional equity is a separate problem for which we should
devise a separate decision procedure, they say.
This time, however, the “CBA’s-not-perfect” excuse is particularly ineffective. When it
comes to discount rates, it is not just that CBA ignores issues of distributional equity, it
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creates them. CBA exacerbates distributional inequity between current and future
generations by making it look like less harm is occurring to future generations than
actually is. So it is not just that CBA leaves something out that can be accounted for
through a separate procedure. Discounting actually distorts the outcome of CBA. This is
one of many ways that CBA obscures relevant issues rather than making them more
transparent.
B. Vulnerability to manipulation
In cataloging the reasons why direct implementation of overall welfare would make such
a bad decision procedure, Adler and Posner (2006) tell us, among other things, that
“Congress, the president, other oversight bodies, and citizens would find it difficult to
monitor official compliance with the direct implementation procedure” because it would
be so complicated and difficult to understand. This would “effectively grant wide discre-
tion to implementing officials” and “badly motivated officials would use this discretion to
advance their own interests” (p. 67). This is precisely the problem with CBA. All of the
difficulties that Adler and Posner acknowledge – imperfect information, wealth effects,
the endowment effect, contested discount rates – make CBA ultimately indeterminate
and therefore endlessly contestable and manipulable in a way that invites political
corruption (Sinden 2005).
In Chapter 4, Adler and Posner (2006) consider these issues – the problem of “badly
motivated” agency officials and whether CBA might be subject to manipulation for
political ends. They invoke game theory to make an argument that CBA is a good decision
procedure even in the face of such pressures, but the argument is ultimately tautological.
They construct a model that is built on a set of assumptions that pre-ordain the conclu-
sion. They ask us to assume that CBA is “costless and perfectly accurate” (p. 107), and “to
imagine that it converts a relationship of asymmetric information to one of full infor-
mation” (p. 104). Based on these assumptions, they construct a model that demonstrates
that when agencies perform CBA, regulatory outcomes will be closer to optimal than
when they do not (pp. 103–108). It is a conclusion that is hard to argue with. If it were in
fact true that CBA provided information that accurately tracked overall welfare in a
costless and transparent way, then it probably would be less subject to manipulation and
political corruption than many other decision procedures. Most people probably do not
need game theory to convince them of that.
Adler and Posner (2006) acknowledge that if, contrary to the assumptions in their
model, CBA is actually expensive and inaccurate, “then it may not be desirable for
agencies to engage in” (p. 109). So the big question is whether CBA does in fact, in the real
world, provide meaningfully accurate information in a transparent way. As Adler and
Posner acknowledge, these are ultimately empirical questions and therefore questions
that their theoretical book fails to answer. As discussed above, there is good reason to
suspect that a whole host of infirmities – inadequate information, wealth effects, the
endowment effect, and discount rates – compromise the accuracy of CBA to a significant
degree. As for transparency, Adler and Posner acknowledge in the context of direct
implementation, that regardless of the quality of the information produced, when a
procedure is too complicated and sophisticated, it may produce results that lay people
cannot follow or replicate, and in this way reduce transparency. That is exactly the case
with CBA, which inevitably involves a host of complicated and inaccessible concepts, like
discount rates and contingent valuation. Adler and Posner assert repeatedly throughout
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the book that CBA enhances transparency, but they never really back the claim up or
respond to the numerous authors who have shown the opposite to be true (Sinden 2004).
C. Inordinate expense
Another problem that Adler and Posner identify with direct implementation of overall
welfare but brush aside when it comes to CBA is the time and expense involved in doing
it. They maintain that direct implementation would be too expensive and time consum-
ing to be practical, but although they acknowledge that CBA is also expensive, they argue
that it is less so. They cite a study by Richard Morgenstern and Marc Landy that indicated
that CBAs cost on average $1 million to $2 million (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 80), and
conclude that, at least where regulations are major, CBA is worth it.
The problem is, by the time one finishes New Foundations, one is hard pressed to
imagine that if Adler and Posner were to look carefully at the CBAs that formed the basis
for the Morgenstern study, they would find them up to snuff. By the time Adler and
Posner are done honestly acknowledging all the ways in which CBA departs from welfare
and coming up with ways to account for these difficulties, they have made CBA even more
cumbersome, expensive, and time consuming than it was to begin with. Now, on top of
all the other difficulties inherent in calculating the costs and benefits of regulations, CBA
analysts also have to (1) launder preferences to eliminate non-ideal and disinterested
preferences (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 72), as well as preferences attributed to the “distor-
tions” of the endowment effect (Adler & Posner 2006, pp. 170–171); (2) possibly weight
preferences to account for wealth effects (Adler & Posner 2006, pp. 72–73); and (3) use
heterogeneous values of statistical lives to reflect the fact that “not every premature death
has the same impact on overall welfare” (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 182), just to name a few.
Although Adler’s and Posner’s theoretical arguments are very well-crafted, the
mystery is why they chose to take the next step and take a position on whether CBA is an
effective decision procedure in the real world. This is, as they acknowledge, ultimately an
empirical question that is beyond the scope of their theoretical book.
III. Sizing up the competition: The feasibility alternative
One of the strengths of New Foundations is its recognition that alternative decision
procedures exist and that the proper question is whether CBA is better or worse than
alternative procedures.
One such alternative is feasibility analysis (Driesen 2005), which focuses on the
relationship between costs and facility finances in order to predict when the costs of
environmental regulations might cause widespread plant shutdowns (Driesen 2005).
Regulators can use feasibility analysis to avoid concentrating costs on workers through
such consequences, but also to recognize when they can regulate pollution with serious
health and environmental effects aggressively without serious economic disruption
(Driesen 2005).
Adler and Posner (2006) employ a typology to argue that CBA likely tracks overall
wellbeing better than the alternatives. This typology divides procedures into wide wel-
farist procedures, narrow welfarist procedures, and non-welfarist procedures (p. 74). By
characterizing CBA as a complete welfarist procedure and feasibility analysis as a non-
welfarist procedure (pp. 75, 78) they make it appear likely that CBA tracks overall
wellbeing better than feasibility analysis. Both CBA and feasibility analysis, however, are
more accurately viewed as narrow welfarist procedures, albeit with differing foci.
Cost–benefit analysis: Shifting sand A. Sinden et al.
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 63
CBA focuses on those aspects of welfare that prove amenable to quantification. This
excludes many, probably most, environmental health effects and nearly all ecological
effects.9 Many of the non-quantifiable benefits CBA neglects are clearly significant. For
example, the possibility that greenhouse gas emissions could trigger feedback loops that
would raise average mean surface temperatures well above the temperatures in climate
change models has played no role in CBA, for the simple reason that scientists cannot tell
us how likely or unlikely this consequence is, or predict its magnitude. Recently, however,
some economists have recognized that this potential catastrophe is a more important fact
than the central benefits estimates of climate change models (Weitzman 2007), which
have, in any event, so far underpredicted climate change. Focusing on the quantifiable
produces a narrow welfarist procedure, not a broad one, because it leaves out significant
environmental and health effects.
Adler’s and Posner’s (2006) response to this problem bears out their sophistication
about economics and their neglect of science. In responding to Lisa Heinzerling’s and
Frank Ackerman’s claim that many environmental benefits cannot be “quantified or
priced,” they emphasize the techniques available for pricing, but ignore the scientific
problem of simply not having enough data to quantify a project’s effects in non-dollar
terms (pp. 162–163). This problem in quantitative risk assessment where it exists (i.e. in
almost every case) makes carrying out the monetization step impossible, because quan-
tification of effects (e.g. number of deaths) provides the number to be multiplied by the
economist’s estimate of a particular effect’s dollar value. If the risk assessment number
for a particular effect predicted by relevant science is zero, because the data are not there
to come up with a number (e.g. climate change feedback loops), then you get zero as the
result, no matter how completely you can monetize an array of hypothetical effects.
Feasibility analysis more comprehensively considers aspects of welfare that are central
to environmental regulation, and should therefore be considered a procedure focused on
welfare. Before regulators even apply a feasibility analysis they must decide whether a
pollutant is likely to endanger public health or the environment.10 This broad regulatory
trigger approach allows them to consider poorly characterized effects, which far too often
turn out to be the most important ones.11 Thus, regulators committed to feasibility
analysis, as it is practiced in our existing laws, consider the welfare benefits of regulation
more completely than regulators distracted by CBA. Furthermore, an endangerment
trigger encourages them to focus on significant health and environmental effects, which
are likely to have more than a transient effect on overall wellbeing. When they get around
to actually regulating, the fact that they cannot quantify the most important effects does
not produce a major inaccuracy under a feasibility approach, because they are not
required to quantify regulatory benefits. By contrast, an emphasis on quantified benefits
distorts regulatory decision-making by leaving out very significant information about
overall wellbeing, often the most significant information available.
A feasibility-based approach aims to maximize the reduction of pollutants. This
maximization seeks to minimize serious potential consequences identified in the prior
endangerment finding. These consequences include death and serious illness. Adler and
Posner recognize that life and bodily integrity are essential components of welfare, and
CBA likewise takes them into account, but to a much more limited extent.
However, the feasibility principle authorizes regulators to forego reductions when a
measure would force the shutdown of a large number of plants (Driesen 2005).12 Feasi-
bility analysis requires the consideration of cost (Adler & Posner 2006, p. 79).13 For some
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reason Adler and Posner treat feasibility as a procedure not considering cost (p. 75), but
every statute including such a criterion requires its consideration (McGarity 1983).14 If
the costs make it likely that a proposed regulation would bankrupt a significant number
of facilities, then the regulator presumptively should declare the level of regulatory
control that renders this result infeasible (Driesen 2005).15
We can justify this attention to shutdowns in terms of a series of welfare relevant
considerations that Adler and Posner (2006) use to explain their concept of overall
wellbeing. They consider unrestricted preferences as telling us nothing of relevance to
overall wellbeing, partially because people can desire that which does them no good
(pp. 33–36). This implies that the dollar costs of regulation, since they represent both
restricted and unrestricted preferences,have no necessary relationship to overall wellbeing.
To correct for this, they require that only those preferences that survive idealization count
(p. 36). This means, probably, that an objective observer would consider the preference as
having some positive objective utility to the holder of the preference (pp. 50–52). In order
to give us some idea of what such restricted preferences might look like, they draw on a list
of desirable goods provided by Martha Nussbaum (see pp. 74–75). Eschewing plant
closures serves several values on Nussbaum’s list that CBA neglects. Plant closures often
lead to firing workers, thereby ending their affiliation with colleagues and upsetting their
position in society (p. 74).16 CBA cannot quantify the value of affiliation, and the magni-
tude of costs cannot by itself tell you when costs will produce such an important disruption
in people’s lives; but a comparison of costs with the economic capabilities of firms, which
feasibility analysis may demand, can warn us about a loss of affiliation (Driesen 2005).17
Furthermore, firing produces a sense of loss that constitutes an emotional loss, of the sort
Nussbaum, and by extension, Adler and Posner recognize as an important welfare loss
(p. 75).18 Furthermore, loss of employment in some contexts gives one a feeling of a loss of
control over one’s environment, another component of welfare neglected by CBA (Adler &
Posner 2006, p. 121).19 In a stable employment situation, an employee can feel she has some
influence on the work environment. Hard work and sensible interaction can lead to
advancement or at least preservation of one’s place. Imposition of an infeasible regulation
can create a welfare loss, in the form of a loss of that control. None of this is quantifiable;
all of it is implicitly recognized in the feasibility principle’s protectionism.
Estimates of the overall magnitude of regulatory costs, however, tell us nothing about
employment consequences. Imposition of high cost regulation on robust firms can lead
to an increase in employment and corresponding welfare gains, as polluters hire workers
to control pollution (Goodstein 1999).20 Small costs imposed on marginal facilities can
make them go under. CBA forces regulators to spend inordinate amounts of time quan-
tifying benefits, quite unreliably, thereby making it harder to carefully consider the
important dimensions of costs. Feasibility analysis, by contrast, considers only laundered
preferences, those cost impact preferences that survive idealization.
Thus, both CBA and feasibility analysis constitute narrow welfare-based “proce-
dures.” Feasibility analysis, however, is more likely to track overall wellbeing, as it focuses
on factors that are important and survive idealization.
A significant weakness of New Foundations involves its failure to acknowledge that,
unlike what feasibility analysis is likely to support, CBA has been consistently employed
as a tool to weaken regulation, with little regard for regulation’s impact on overall
wellbeing (Bagley & Revesz 2006).21 Acknowledging this fact would not destroy the case
for CBA and would lead to a more fruitful dialogue about how much of its poor track
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record is inherent in CBA and how much is due to other factors. The literature strongly
supports the conclusion that OMB, in Republican and Democratic administrations alike,
has consistently favored weakening environmental regulations.22
Adler’s and Posner’s (2006) response is that the consensus does not foreclose the
possibility that EPA is consistently overzealous, at least when OMB intervenes, and that
OMB’s consistent direction simply counteracts this bias (p. 121).23 If Adler and Posner are
right that CBA makes regulation transparent, one would expect them to come up with
strong affirmative evidence, in the form of some regulation revealed by CBA to be clearly
overzealous. After all, CBA has been part of government for a long time now.
The available evidence shows that OMB’s pattern stems from something other than
OMB using accurate CBA to correct a clearly overzealous EPA. First, OMB favors weaker
regulation in most cases with no basis on CBA at all (Driesen 2006).24 This suggests that
part of CBA’s role is to justify institutions that are dedicated to weakening regulation
regardless of the outcome of analysis. Second, OMB opposed regulation when CBA
showed that the regulation would generate monetized benefits exceeding costs.25 Third,
there is only one recorded case of OMB pushing for stronger regulation in its history, even
though a lot of CBA shows benefits in excess of costs, a sign that a stricter regulation
would be optimal in economic terms.26 Fourth, where OMB opposed regulation on the
basis of a claim that costs really did exceed benefits, a surprisingly infrequent occurrence,
OMB consistently reached this conclusion by rejecting agency valuations and fighting for
very low valuations.27
IV. Conclusion
The CBA debate is far from over. But with New Foundations, Adler and Posner have
brought a new depth, honesty, and intellectual precision to the table, and begun to
transform what has so often been a shouting match into a respectful, if still heated,
conversation. Out of this conversation, we can begin to see emerging new questions that
have often been ignored in the heat of the fray, but which may offer new paths forward.
If welfarism should share the public policy stage with other values, what are those values
and how can we incorporate them into decision-making? If CBA is not a moral criterion,
but simply an imperfect proxy – a practical tool – then how can we best evaluate how well
that tool is working in the real world? Does it tend to counteract existing weaknesses in
our political institutions or exacerbate them? And how does it measure up to alternatives?
Is it more or less perfect than other decision procedures at approximating what we really
care about? Although Adler and Posner have not definitively answered these questions,
they have done the scholarly community a great service in New Foundations by raising
promising avenues for further theoretical and empirical inquiry.
Notes
1 Although the three subsequent parts of this review essay are presented in co-authored form,
Doug Kysar authored Part I, Amy Sinden authored Part II, and David Driesen authored
Part III.
2 To their credit, Adler and Posner (2006) recognize that much theoretical work remains to be
done regarding their restricted preferentialist account, referring to the exclusion of other-
regarding preferences as “something of a promissory note, since no one has yet fully explained
what the difference is between ‘self-interested’ and ‘disinterested’ preferences” (p. 49).
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3 This separationist approach is evident in their suggestion that CBA should not include
so-called “existence values,” typically derived through contingent valuation studies, since
respondents to such studies are often expressing their views “as a valuation of the violation of
a moral commitment, not as a valuation of an environmental amenity” (Adler & Posner 2006,
pp. 134–135). In other words, unless an environmental benefit would actually impact an
individual’s welfare, as opposed to comport with their moral or political values, the benefit
should not be counted. Again, the problem with this approach lies in the assumption that an
unproblematic definition and basis for measurement of “welfare” can be identified.
4 An anonymous reviewer wrote in reference to this passage,“If preferences are no longer treated
as exogenous, then I think it makes the problem intractable.”Without denying the significance
of this concern to the academic project of welfare economics, it bears noting that law’s task is
often precisely to mediate the gap between theoretical tractability and lived experience.
5 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System – Final Regulations to Establish
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg.
41,576, 41, 660–61 (July 9, 2004).
6 Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Mobile Sources, 71 Fed. Reg. 15804, 15907–10
(Mar. 29, 2006).
7 US EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Regulatory Impact Analysis of the
Final Clean Air Mercury Rule, EPA-452/R-05-003, 3–10 to 3–14 (March 2005). Available
from URL: http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/mercury_ria_final.pdf.
8 “The feasibility of distributive weighting has been much debated, without a clear resolution,
by welfare economists.”
9 See, e.g. Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Progress in Regulatory Reform: 2004 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities 18 (2004), which
discusses major benefits not quantified in the CBA of a rule reducing water pollution from
animal feed operations; Parker (2003), which explains the difficulties with non-cancer health
effects and ecological effects, and gives numerous examples of failure to count non-
quantifiable benefits.
10 See, e.g. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462–63 (2007), which holds that the EPA
should have made a finding on whether greenhouse gases endanger public health or welfare
under the Clean Air Act; Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 653 (1980)
(plurality opinion), in which the US Supreme Court required the agency to make a finding of
significant risk of material health impairment prior to regulation under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act.
11 See, e.g. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1976), which discusses the agency’s
examination of lead’s health effects as part of a finding of endangerment in spite of significant
uncertainties and the inability to quantify the effects of lead in gasoline; Ackerman et al.
(2005, pp. 160–172), which explains that regulation enacted under an endangerment trigger
when benefits could not be quantified generated the data that made CBA possible in later
phases of the lead phase-down.
12 Driesen (2005, p. 3) characterizes the feasibility principle as embodying a preference for
avoiding widespread plant shutdowns.
13 Driesen (2005, p. 2) points out that the feasibility principle considers cost in order to identify
the maximum feasible level of emission reductions.
14 McGarity (1983) states that costs are “invariably” considered in setting technology-based
standards. See, e.g. Kennecott Copper v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 456 (4th Cir. 1985), which finds that
Congress required consideration of cost in setting technology-based effluent reduction stan-
dards under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
15 Driesen (2005) justifies this interpretation of the feasibility principle.
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16 Adler and Posner list affiliation as an objective good.
17 Driesen (2005) explains that comparison of costs with firms’ economic capabilities, not with
benefits, helps predict plant shutdowns.
18 Adler and Posner include emotions on a list of objective goods.
19 Adler and Posner list “control over the environment” as an objective good.
20 See Goodstein (1999) who explains that pollution control requirements often create blue-
collar jobs.
21 Bagley & Revesz (2006, pp. 1268–1269) describe CBA as a “one-way ratchet” that weakens
regulation, rather than maximizing net benefits; Driesen (2006, p. 384) concludes after a review
of the relevant literature and a fresh assessment of recent experience that CBA proponents
within the government “almost invariably use it to weaken regulation” and that cost–benefit
criteria in statutes, where they exist, have stymied it altogether; McGarity (2002, p. 2342) states
that the process of CBA has “thoroughly stymied government action under” TSCA and FIFRA;
Johnston (2002, p. 1392) states that the EPA had only re-registered two of 19,000 older
pesticides by 1992 under FIFRA; Hornstein (1993, pp. 436–437 & n.395). For a discussion of the
recent contrary sounding claims, see Driesen (2006, pp. 354–364, 380–384); Bagley and Revesz
(2006, pp. 1277–1280), which discuss the prompt letters that CBA advocates sometimes cite as
evidence of CBA increasing the stringency of regulation.
22 See Gen. Accounting Office, Regulatory Reform: Implementation of the Regulatory Review
Executive Order 13 (1996), which provides three examples of pro-industry regulatory changes
suggested by OMB under Clinton, but not pro-environmental changes.
23 Adler and Posner actually state that if EPA tends to overregulate then “it is proper for OMB to
push for greater stringency” (p. 121, emphasis added). I am assuming that this is a typo, and
that Adler and Posner meant that overregulation properly triggers a push for lesser, not
greater, stringency.
24 Driesen (2006, pp. 376–378) explains that OMB consistently opposed rules when data gaps
prevented the completion of CBA and even when a rule mandating a transfer fee generated no
societal costs.
25 69 Fed. Reg. 41, 576, 41, 660–61 (July 9, 2004) at 369–70.
26 69 Fed. Reg. 41, 576, 41, 660–61 (July 9, 2004) at 384 concludes that with the single exception
of the regulation of lead in gasoline, CBA acted as a one-way ratchet, sometimes weakening
but never strengthening regulation.
27 69 Fed. Reg. 41, 576, 41, 660–61 (July 9, 2004) at 369–372 finds that the EPA found benefits
exceeding costs in all six cases where it conducted a CBA, but that OMB resisted that
conclusion in three cases, and discusses specific cases.
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